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Copperweld Corporation v. Independence
Tube Corporation: The Death of a Doctrine
I. Introduction
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,' a di-
vided Supreme Court2 held that a corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring to restrain
trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act.3
In doing so, the Court clarified a previously confused area of an-
titrust law and expressly repudiated the intraenterprise conspir-
acy doctrine.4 Under the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, 5
enunciated in earlier Supreme Court decisions, common owner-
ship of separately incorporated entities did not exempt the ac-
tions of those entities from section one scrutiny, which prohibits
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade.'
1. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
2. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a five to three majority was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice White took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). In pertinent part, section one states that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is
declared to be illegal."
4. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
5. Intraenterprise conspiracy refers to a conspiracy between separately incorporated
units of a parent-subsidiary enterprise. Conspiracies among separate divisions, officers,
or directors of a single corporation are labeled intra-corporate conspiracies. The two
terms are often used interchangeably. See Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 717 n.4 (1977);
see also Note, All in the Family: When Will Internal Discussion be Labeled Intra-En-
terprise Conspiracy, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 63, 64 (1975).
6. Section one reaches unreasonable restraints of trade caused by a "contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy" between separate entities. It does not reach conduct that is
wholly unilateral. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Thus, in order to find
a section one violation there must be a plurality of actors. The intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine suggests that a parent and its subsidiary, because they are separately incorpo-
rated, constitute a plurality of actors subject to section one liability. Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). In dictum, the Court stated that the key
question was whether there was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and if that was
found, the combination (entity) could not escape section one liability because of its cho-
sen corporate form. Id. at 377. Relying on this dictum in United States v. Yellow Cab
1
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The broad language of the Court's decisions gave rise to uncer-
tainty with regard to the reach of section one of the Sherman
Act.
Part II of this Note discusses the development of the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine in the Supreme Court, includ-
ing the scholarly commentary and criticism of the doctrine. Part
III sets forth the facts of Copperweld and the decisions of the
district court and circuit court of appeals. Part IV presents the
Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions. Part V ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court's decision, including the Court's rea-
sons for repudiating the doctrine and the arguments advanced
by the dissent for retaining the doctrine. Part VI concludes that
Copperweld was correct in repudiating the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine, because the doctrine served no useful antitrust
purpose.
II. Background
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act 7 was intended to prevent unrea-
sonable restraints of interstate commerce.' The general purpose
of the Sherman Act is to preserve a system of free trade in order
to protect the public from the evils thought to flow from undue
restraints and monopolies by encouraging competition and pre-
cluding combinations that tend to defeat it.' Section one of the
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court held that common ownership did not exempt sepa-
rately incorporated entities from section one liability for conspiring to restrain trade. In
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), the Court, citing
Yellow Cab, stated that common ownership would not relieve the defendants from liabil-
ity under the antitrust laws, especially when they hold themselves out as competitors. In
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the Court merely
stated that prior decisions established that common ownership could not exempt the
defendant from antitrust liability. The Court in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), seemed to limit the Yellow Cab holding that
common ownership could not relieve the defendants from any obligations that the law
imposed upon separate entities by stating that, in any event, the petitioner could charge
a combination between himself and the defendants. Thus, the Court may have used the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine as an alternative ground upon which liability could
be found.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
8. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
9. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 50-51 (D.
Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Northwestern Oil Co., v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
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Act prohibits any contract, combination, or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade. 10 The Supreme Court, however, has concluded
that only "unreasonable" restraints of trade or commerce are
prohibited under section one. 1 In determining whether a re-
straint is unreasonable, courts generally apply a "rule of reason,"
which involves considering all of the factors and circumstances
in each given situation. 2 Certain agreements or practices, how-
ever, because of their "pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue," are considered to be unreasonable per
se violations of section one.'3
A violation of section one requires a plurality of actors.14 In
order to find a "conspiracy" under section one, there must be an
"agreement" between the parties to the conspiracy. This "agree-
ment" need not be express or formal; it is sufficient that con-
certed action is contemplated and that the defendants conform
to the arrangement." In contrast, the actions of a single firm or
138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
11. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. The rule of reason analysis includes "consideration of the facts peculiar to the
business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, and
the reasons for its adoption." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
The "rule of reason" is employed in cases in which the restraint may have a tendency to
suppress competition but may also have certain redeeming features that, under appropri-
ate circumstances, will save it from condemnation under section one. See Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co.,
260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
13. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (Price fixing,
group boycotts, and tying arrangements were among the practices that were illegal per se
under the Sherman Act.). See also Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 453, 458 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (Price fixing, retail price maintenance enforced by con-
certed action without aid of fair trade laws, concerted boycotts or refusal to deal, second-
ary boycotts, or tying patent to use of unpatented materials are per se unreasonable.).
14. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). "Section 1 of the Sherman Act
reaches unreasonable restraint of trade effected by a 'contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy' between separate entities. It does not reach conduct that is 'wholly unilateral.'"
Id. See also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1976) (Section one
can only be violated by two separate entitites acting in concert.), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
910 (1977); United States v. Reading Co., 183 F. 427, 455 (3d Cir. 1910) ("To violate the
act, there must be a contract combination or conspiracy, which in purpose or effect tends
to restrain trade . . . . [T]here must be the meeting of the minds of two or more, to
accomplish some common purpose directly violative of the act.").
15. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United States
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
3
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entity are governed by section two of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits monopolization or attempts to monopolize whether ac-
complished through joint action or unilaterally."6
The Sherman Act contains this basic distinction between
concerted and independent action for several reasons. Congress
treated concerted activity more strictly than unilateral activity
because "concerted activity is inherently fraught with anticom-
petitive risks."17 The conduct of a single firm is judged less
stringently because of the difficulty in distinguishing "robust
competition" from long run anticompetitive behavior.1 8 Because
of the ambiguity and the anticompetitive risks inherent in con-
certed activity, the burden of proof for a section one violation is
less than the burden of proof for a section two violation.1 9
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize . ..trade or commerce . ..shall be deemed to be guilty of a felony .. " Id.
Section two thus prohibits not only the actions of a single firm that does monopolize
trade but also attempts to monopolize trade by a single entity. To establish a prima facie
case of attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) specific in-
tent to control prices or destroy competition with respect to a part of commerce, (2)
predatory conduct directed at accomplishing the unlawful purpose, and (3) a dangerous
probability of success. Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Bartleys Town & Country Shops, Inc. v. Dilling-
ham Corp., 530 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Hawaii 1982).
17. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). In National Cotton
Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), the Court said:
It is the power to control prices which makes the inducement of combinations...
. It is such power that makes it the concern of law to prohibit or limit them ....
[Clompetition not combination, should be the law of trade. If there is evil in this
it is accepted as less than that which may result from the unification of interests,
and the power such unification gives.
Id. at 129. In United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898), the Court noted
that "[iut is the combination of these large and powerful corporations ...that consti-
tutes the alleged evil." Id. at 571. Because in any conspiracy, two or more entities that
previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one, for their
common benefit, Congress viewed conspiracies as far more dangerous to competition
than the actions of a single firm to restrain trade. Although mergers between separate
entities may lead to efficiencies which benefit the consumer, the anticompetitive poten-
tial of mergers is great enough to warrant strict scrutiny even in the absence of an incipi-
ent monopoly. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2741
(1984).
18. Thus, it is not enough to show that a single firm's behavior is "restraining trade"
in order to be subject to antitrust sanctions; the single firm's activity must reach a level
of threatening monopolization. United States v. Whiting, 212 F. 466, 478 (D. Mass.
1914). "There may be ... an unreasonable restraint of trade which does not constitute a
monopoly." Id. See also Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740 n.13.
19. See Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/6
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Section one's focus on concerted behavior leaves a "gap" in
the Sherman Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints
of trade: the anticompetitive actions of a single firm, which do
not threaten monopolization proscribed by section two, are per-
mitted by section one, even though the anticompetitive actions
of a single firm may be indistinguishable in economic effect from
the conduct of two firms subject to section one liability.20 The
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine seems to have been estab-
lished in an attempt to address this supposed "gap" between
sections one and two.21
B. Supreme Court Recognition of the Intraenterprise Conspir-
acy Doctrine
The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine subjects the activity
of a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to the
proscriptions of section one of the Sherman Act. The doctrine
establishes that a parent and its subsidiary constitute two le-
gally separate entities capable of conspiring to restrain trade in
violation of section one. Under the doctrine, the common owner-
ship of the parent and subsidiary does not shield them from sec-
tion one liability for activities which, if engaged in by two sepa-
rately owned entities, would violate section one of the Sherman
Act. The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine has been gleaned
from a series of Supreme Court decisions subjecting the actions
of a parent and subsidiary to section one prohibitions.2 2
United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,23 was the first Supreme
Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 67 (1981). The authors state:
To recover under section 1 a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a contract,
combination or conspiracy; (2) constituting unreasonable restraint of trade result-
ing therefrom; and (3) causing antitrust injury. [Under section 2 the plaintiff must
show] (1) specific intent to monopolize; conduct designed to implement that in-
tent; and a dangerous probability of success; or (2) possession of monopoly power
and willful acquisition or maintenance of that power.
Id.
20. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744.
21. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 19, at 67. The intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine "has served principally as a tool for plaintiffs in private treble damage actions
to attempt to reach behavior not covered by section 2 and which is actionable under
section 1 only if engaged in by two or more entities." Id.
22. See supra note 6.
23. 332 U.S. 218 (1942).
1985]
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Court decision expressly to recognize that commonly owned cor-
porations could "conspire" in restraint of trade within the mean-
ing of section one.2' In Yellow Cab, the controlling shareholder
of the Checker Cab Manufacturing Corp. also controlled, pri-
marily through acquisition or merger, numerous companies oper-
ating taxi cabs in four cities. The complaint alleged conspiracies
in restraint of trade that violated sections one and two of the
Sherman Act. The alleged conspiracy "restrained trade" by forc-
ing the several operating companies to purchase their cabs from
the Checker Cab Manufacturing Corp2 5 The court concluded
that combinations and conspiracies of the type alleged violated
the Sherman Act.2 6
The Court, in concluding that section one of the Sherman
Act was applicable, stated that the test of illegality under the
Sherman Act was the presence or absence of an "unreasonable
restraint of trade," and such a restraint could be as easily effec-
tuated by a conspiracy between commonly owned affiliated enti-
ties as by a conspiracy among otherwise independent entities.27
Relying on Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,28 the
Court in Yellow Cab concluded that "the common ownership
and control of the various corporate appellees are impotent to
liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the impact
of the Act."' 29 This broad language gave rise to the intraenter-
24. Id. at 227.
25. Id. at 225. This arrangement excluded all other cab manufacturers from 86% of
the Chicago market, 15% of the New York market, 100% of the Pittsburgh market, and
58% of the Minneapolis market. Id. at 224.
26. Id. at 226. The Court stated that "[bly excluding all cab manufacturers other
than CCM from that part of the market represented by the cab operating companies
under their control, the appellees effectively limit the outlets through which cabs may be
sold in interstate commerce. Limitations of that nature have been condemned time and
again as violative of the Act." Id.
27. Id. at 227.
28. 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The Court stated that the Sherman Act is aimed at sub-
stance rather than form. Thus, the corporate interrelationships of the conspirators are
not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. Id. at 360-61, 376-77.
29. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 227. The Court noted that the
complaint charged that the restraint of trade was not only affected by the combination
of the appellees but was the primary object of the combination. The Court, citing United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944), stated that if that theory were
proved, a plain violation of the Act had occurred. Thus, it was unclear whether this
theory would have to be proved on remand in order for a section one violation to be
found, or whether the violation, as suggested by the decision, could be based upon the
[Vol. 5:879
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prise conspiracy doctrine, and has been subject to many differ-
ing interpretations, resulting in confusion in the lower courts
and much criticism from scholars.30
In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,3' the
Court invoked the broad language of Yellow Cab and held that
two wholly owned subsidiaries of Seagram's had violated section
one of the Sherman Act by jointly refusing to supply a whole-
saler who refused to comply with a maximum resale pricing
scheme.32 The Court rejected the respondents' claim that "their
status as mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-mer-
chandising unit makes it impossible for them to have conspired
in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act."'3 3 The Court main-
tained that such a contention was inconsistent with previous de-
cisions, such as Yellow Cab, which held that common ownership
and control would not liberate corporations from the impact of
the antitrust laws.34 The Court went on to observe that "the rule
is especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold them-
selves out as competitors."3 5 This language added to the confu-
sion surrounding the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.36
conspiracy between the already affiliated corporations. United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. at 228.
In Crescent Amusement, the Court found violations of sections one and two by com-
monly owned film exhibitors. In finding a conspiracy, the Court viewed the affiliated
entities as the conspirators. But, in affirming an order for divestiture, the Court noted
that such a remedy was appropriate when "creation of the combination is itself the viola-
tion." United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. at 189.
30. See infra notes 46-50, 94 and accompanying text.
31. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
32. Id. at 212. See also Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2738 n.9.
33. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. at 215.
34. Id. (discussing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 227).
35. Id. at 215. This language caused even more speculation as to the applicability of
the doctrine. It was unclear whether the Court intended this "holding out as competi-
tors" to be a definite limitation on the reach of the doctrine or simply one instance in
which the doctrine could be invoked. Some courts and commentators have supported the
"holding out" test as a way to limit the potentially broad reach of the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine. See, e.g., Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093,
1094 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using
Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968).
36. See, e.g, Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies: Has "Seagram" Distilled A More Po-
tent Brew?, 24 Bus. LAW 173, 175-76 (1968) (calling Kiefer-Stewart a "troublesome" de-
cision and "the highwater-mark" of the doctrine); Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under
Section I of the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REv. 661, 668 (1982) (noting that several
lower courts adopted the "holding out" language as a limit on the intraenterprise con-
19851
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Shortly thereafter, the Court relied upon Yellow Cab and
Kiefer-Stewart to apply the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine,
in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.37 Timken in-
volved restrictive horizontal agreements between a United
States based parent corporation and two overseas corporations
in which it owned thirty and fifty percent interests.38 The Court
rejected the appellants' contention that the trade restraints were
merely incidental to an otherwise legitimate joint venture, hold-
ing that prior decisions clearly established that the trade re-
straints existing in this case were illegal under the Sherman Act
whether effected by affiliated or nonaffiliated corporations. 9
Finally, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp.,40 the complaint alleged a conspiracy between a parent
corporation and three subsidiaries to restrict illegally the fran-
chisee plaintiffs and lessen substantially competition in certain
automobile parts sales in violation of section one of the Sherman
Act.4 '1 The Supreme Court held that, based on the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine, the petitioners' Sherman Act claim
was not barred by the common ownership of the defendants. 2
Citing Timken and Yellow Cab, the Court stated that because
the respondents had availed themselves of the privilege of doing
business through separately incorporated units, their common
ownership would not operate to exempt them from the obliga-
tions placed upon separate entities by the Sherman Act.43 This
spiracy doctrine and that the Court failed to give any guidelines for application of the
language).
37. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
38. Id. at 595, 601.
39. Id. at 598. Some commentators have argued that this holding is not as broad as
the language may suggest. See Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 717 (1977). The Note sug-
gests that the holding in Timken may be narrower than the language seems. The in-
traenterprise holding may merely be an alternative holding because there is language in
the case to support a finding that the initial combination of the firms and their subse-
quent activities were illegal because they effectuated a previous conspiracy among the
firms. Id. at 722. Thus, it may be that Timken supports only a narrow interpretation of
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, namely, that it is only applicable when the ini-
tial combination itself was in violation of antitrust laws. See supra note 29. See also
Handler & Smart, supra note 19, at 32-33; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 35, at 46-48.
40. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
41. Id. at 135.
42. Id. at 141-42.
43. Id. (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. at 598; United
[Vol. 5:879
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decision contained language suggesting that the doctrine may
only have been used as an alternative holding."" The Court
stated, that "[in any event each petitioner can clearly charge a
combination between Midas and himself, as of the day he un-
willingly complied with the restrictive franchise agreement . . .
or between Midas and other franchise dealers."' 5 The in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine has caused some confusion in
lower federal courts attempting to apply the doctrine articulated
by the Supreme Court in these decisions.
C. Application of the Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine in
the Lower Courts.
Federal courts have struggled to give definition to the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine as it has been broadly enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court. The broad, sweeping language of
the Supreme Court's intraenterprise conspiracy cases left the
circuit courts the task of limiting the scope of the doctrine. Dif-
ferent tests and limitations have developed in each of the federal
circuit courts that have considered the issue. 6
The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits have adopted an ap-
proach much like that of the Supreme Court. That is, a parent
and a wholly owned subsidiary, by their separate incorporation,
provide the plurality of actors required by section one.47
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 227).
44. Id. at 142. See also supra notes 29, 39 and accompanying text; Handler &
Smart, supra note 19, at 34 ("Inclusion of these alternative holdings strongly suggests
that the intracorporate conspiracy holding was unnecessary on the facts presented.");
Note, supra note 39, at 726 n.56 (arguing that, based upon a reading of the separate
opinions of Justices Harlan, Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall, the section one viola-
tion rested not on the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, but rather on the "arrange-
ment" of "agreement" between the plaintiffs and the defendant enterprise).
45. Perma Life Muffler, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 142 (citing
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. at 150 n.6 and Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964)).
46. The Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia have not expressly considered the issue.
47. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d
547 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine embracing par-
ents and wholly owned subsidiaries was conclusively established by the Supreme Court's
adherence to Yellow Cab), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Columbia Metal Culvert
Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 (3d Cir.) (holding that the prerequi-
sites of a conspiracy under section one were fulfilled by the presence of two or more
legally distinct corporations), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l
19851
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This formalistic approach has been rejected by other circuit
courts as elevating form over substance. Thus, the Second, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have developed a more "sub-
stantive" test."8 This test requires that the court analyze all of
the facts and circumstances in each case to determine whether
the corporations are in fact a "single entity." The factors to be
examined include: the extent of the integration of ownership,
whether the two corporations have separate managerial staffs,
the extent to which significant efficiencies would be sacrificed if
they were required to act as two firms, their history, whether
they functioned as separate firms before being partially inte-
grated, and the extent to which they may, acting as one, wield
market power which they would not possess if viewed as sepa-
rate firms.' If, based on a review of these factors, the corpora-
tions do in fact constitute a single entity, conspiracy under sec-
tion one cannot be found.50
Faced with a conflict among the circuits concerning the
proper application of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine,
Copperweld presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity
to address the Seventh Circuit's functional analysis and to re-
consider the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. at 598) ("It is well established that a corporation can combine and con-
spire with its wholly owned subsidiary in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
48. Initially, the Second Circuit seemed to limit the liability of affiliated corpora-
tions for intraenterprise conspiracy to situations in which they "held themselves out" as
competitors. See Triebwasser & Katz v. A.T.&T., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976).
But recently the Second Circuit seems to have adopted the "single entity" substantive
approach of the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth circuits. See Brager & Co. v. Leumi Sec.
Corp., 429 F. Supp. 1341, 1345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 646 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). See also Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581,
588 (8th Cir. 1981); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Knutsen v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 801-02
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
49. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d at 726.
50. Id. at 727.
[Vol. 5:879
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III. Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube
Corporation: Factual Setting and Lower Court Opinions
A. The Facts
In 1968, Lear Siegler, Inc. purchased the Regal Tube Co., a
manufacturer of steel tubing, and made it an unincorporated di-
vision of Lear Siegler, Inc. David Grohne, who had been the
vice-president of Regal Tube Co., became the president of the
division.51 In 1972, Copperweld, Inc. purchased Regal from Lear
Siegler and organized it as a separately incorporated wholly
owned subsidiary.52 Under the sale agreement, Lear Siegler and
its subsidiaries agreed not to compete with Regal in the United
States for five years. 3 Shortly before the sale, David Grohne
joined the Lear Siegler management.
In May of 1972, while continuing to work for Siegler, David
Grohne established Independence Tube Corp., which was to
manufacture steel tubing. The Yoder Co. of Cleveland, Ohio,
agreed to sell a tubing mill to Independence, and in December of
1972, Independence gave Yoder a purchase order, calling for de-
livery of the mill by December, 1973.5"
Officials at Copperweld felt that Independence's activities
were in violation of the noncompetition agreement they had
with Lear Siegler.5 5 They sent a letter warning Yoder of their
concern, stating that they would take any and all steps necessary
to protect the corporation's rights under the purchase and sale
agreement with Lear Siegler.5 As a result of Copperweld's warn-
ing letter, Yoder voided its acceptance of Independence's
51. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir.
1982).
52. Id. at 313-14.
53. Id. at 313. The companies were in the business of manufacturing steel tubing.
Thus Lear Siegler, under the agreement, was not to compete with Regal in the manufac-
ture and sale of steel tubing for use in heavy equipment, cargo vehicles, and
construction.
54. Id. at 314.
55. Id. Grohne had hired eight key former employees of Regal to work for Indepen-
dence. Officials at Copperweld believed these hirings posed a threat of luring away key
Regal employees and allowing Independence to obtain Regal's proprietary information
and know-how from these employees. Id.
56. Id. The stated purpose of the letter was to prevent third parties from developing
reliance interests in dealings with Grohne and Independence that might later make a
court reluctant to enjoin Grohne's activities at Copperweld's behest. Id.
1985]
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purchase order.5 7
In 1976, Independence filed suit in federal district court in
Chicago against Copperweld, Regal, and Yoder.5 8 The complaint
charged, inter alia, violations of sections one and two of the
Sherman Act and sought compensatory and punitive damages
and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.59 The defen-
dants denied all of the allegations and counterclaimed, charging
violation of the Lear Siegler agreement and unfair competition."
B. The Lower Court Opinions
The case was tried to a jury in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 1 In a bifurcated trial,
the jury found that Copperweld and Regal had conspired in vio-
lation of section one, but that Yoder had not been involved in
the conspiracy.6
2
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the de-
fendants argued that they could not, as a matter of law, have
conspired in violation of section one of the Sherman Act because
57. Id.
58. The district court opinion is unreported. Philip Smith, the Chief Executive Of-
ficer of Copperweld Corporation, was named as a defendant in the original complaint.
Before trial he was dropped as an individual defendant from all counts. Id. at 315.
59. Id. Specifically, the complaint charged that Copperweld, Regal, Smith, and
Yoder had conspired to restrain trade in the steel structural tubing market in violation
of section one of the Sherman Act; that Copperweld, Regal, and Smith had attempted to
monopolize the steel tubing market in violation of section two of the Sherman Act; that
Yoder breached its contract with Independence; that Copperweld, Regal, and Smith had
interfered with Independence's contractual relationship with Yoder and business rela-
tionship with Deere Plow & Planter Works (Deere); and that Copperweld, Regal, and
Smith had slandered and libeled Independence with Deere. Before trial, Independence
dismissed its section two monopolization claim. Id.
60. Id. The unfair competition claim stemmed from Independence's hiring of several
key Regal employees. Copperweld and Regal also charged that Independence and
Grohne interfered with prospective contractual and other business relationships of the
defendants in filing their lawsuits on the eve of a thirty million dollar debenture offering
by Copperweld. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The jury found Yoder to be liable for breach of its contract with Indepen-
dence. It also found that Copperweld had interfered with Independence's contractual
relationship with Yoder, that Regal had interfered with Independence's business rela-
tionship with Deere, and that Regal had slandered Independence to Deere. Treble dam-
ages were entered against Copperweld and Regal on the antitrust violation. A directed
verdict was entered against Copperweld and Regal on all of their counterclaims. The
defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/6
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they were not sufficiently distinct entities under'the test devel-
oped in Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.1 Specifically, the de-
fendants argued that the trial judge's jury instruction was defec-
tive because it failed to enumerate specifically the factors
established in Photovest," and that the evidence adduced at
trial was insufficient, under the Photovest criteria, to support a
finding that the defendants were in fact "separate entities." 65
In affirming the judgment of the district court, the court of
appeals stated its adherence to the functional analysis developed
in Photovest," holding that liability under section one is appro-
priate "when there is enough separation between the two enti-
ties to make treating them as two independent actors sensi-
ble."'6 7 The court concluded that, although the trial judge's
instructions failed to enumerate specifically the factors devel-
oped in Photovest, "the charge emphasized to the jury that they
were looking for real, rather than merely formal distinctness. '" 68
The court also concluded that the evidence was clearly sufficient
to support a jury finding of true separateness between Cop-
perweld and Regal. 9
63. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 691 F.2d at 315-16 (discussing
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
917 (1980)). In Photovest, the Seventh Circuit applied a functional test to determine
whether two commonly owned separately incorporated firms could conspire in violation
of section one. The test involves an inquiry into the actual relationship between the two
corporations based on several factors. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. If,
upon a weighing of all the factors, the corporations are found to be in fact separate
entities, then they may properly be subject to section one scrutiny. Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d at 726.
64. For a listing of the factors, see supra text accompanying note 49.
65. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d at 318.
66. Id. The court said that "[i]n short, Photovest represents a reasonable and prag-
matic approach to the intra-enterprise conspiracy problem, and we intend in what fol-
lows to adhere to it." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 319.
69. Id. at 320. The plaintiff submitted evidence from which the jury could have
found that Copperweld intended to keep its ongoing business and continue to serve the
market and customers it was serving; Regal management had real autonomy; Regal's
expenses and revenues were segregated and Regal's operating managers' compensation
was based primarily on Regal's profitability; Regal maintained a separate sales force and
clientele and made its own arrangements with suppliers of raw materials and equipment.
Id.
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IV. The Supreme Court Opinions
A. The Majority
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,7° reversed the
Seventh Circuit and held that a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary were legally incapable of conspiring with each other
under section one of the Sherman Act.7' Initially, the Court
noted that it had never before considered the merits of the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine in depth, stating that
"[a]lthough the Court has expressed approval of the doctrine on
a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy
was in all but perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result. '72
Tracing the origins of the doctrine in its decisions from Yellow
Cab to Perma Life, the Court dismissed the broad language in
each instance as a mere alternative rationale. 73
Noting the basic Sherman Act distinction between con-
certed and independent action,7 the Court reasoned that it was
plain that an agreement to implement the policies of a single,
unitary firm did not raise the antitrust dangers that section one
was designed to police. 75 Thus, the coordination between a cor-
poration and its division does not warrant scrutiny under sec-
tion one 76 because the coordination does not represent a joining
of two independent sources of economic power that had previ-
70. See supra note 2.
71. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2745 (1984).
72. Id. at 2736. The instance that the Court refers to is Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
73. Id. at 2736-39. The Court stated that in Yellow Cab the affiliation of the defen-
dants was irrelevant because the original acquisitions were themselves illegal; in Timken,
as in Yellow Cab, there was evidence that the stock acquisitions were themselves
designed to effectuate restrictive practices; in Perma Life Mufflers, each plaintiff could
allege a combination between the defendants or between the defendants and other
franchise dealers. Thus, the Court concluded that in each of these cases the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine was "at most" an alternative holding. Id.
74. Id. at 2740 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464
(1984)).
75. Id. at 2741. The Court stated that Congress' reasons for treating concerted be-
havior more strictly than unilateral behavior was readily appreciated because concerted
activity was inherently fraught with anticompetitive risk. See supra notes 17-18 and ac-
companying text.
76. See Cliff Food Stores v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1969); Jo-
seph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 83-84 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1969).
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ously pursued separate interests." Furthermore, the majority
observed that a rule subjecting such coordinated activity to sec-
tion one liability would frustrate antitrust objectives by depriv-
ing consumers of the efficiencies achieved through decentralizing
management.78
Similarly, the Court asserted that a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary constitute a single enterprise for purposes of
section one of the Sherman Act because both share a complete
unity of interest.79 Moreover, the majority maintained that this
unity of interest makes an agreement in Sherman Act terms be-
tween a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary meaningless; if a
wholly owned subsidiary departs from the common corporate
design, the parent may assert full control.8
Finally, the Court concluded that the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine focused on the form of an enterprise's structure
and ignored the reality; a corporation's choice of a particular
corporate structure should not increase its exposure to antitrust
liability because the decision involves questions of business
judgment aimed at efficiency of control and economy of opera-
tions, goals which are not inherently anticompetitive.81
B. The Dissent
The dissent's main objection was that the Court established
a per se rule that a wholly owned subsidiary is incapable of con-
spiring with its parent under section one of the Sherman Act.
For the dissent, the appropriate inquiry was whether the coordi-
nated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary may
ever have anticompetitive effects.82 Stating that repudiation of
prior cases was not a step that should be taken lightly, the dis-
77. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2743. Because there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about a corpora-
tion's decision to create a subsidiary, the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine "impose[s]
grave legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that are of de minimus mean-
ing and effect." Id. (quoting Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products
Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962) (emphasis in original)).
82. Id. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that "[i]f, as seems to
be the case, the challenged conduct was manifestly anticompetitive, it should not be
immunized from scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id.
1985]
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sent argued that the better course of action was to continue to
rely on the "Rule of Reason[, which] has always given the courts
adequate latitude to examine the substance rather than the form
of an arrangement when answering the question whether collec-
tive action has restrained competition within the meaning of §
1."83 Noting that the majority's per se rule was inconsistent with
at least seven previous Supreme Court decisions applying the in-
tracorporate conspiracy doctrine," the dissent argued that the
plain language of several of the prior decisions showed that the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was not merely an alterna-
tive rationale.8" In rebutting the majority's characterization of
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine as a mere alternative ra-
tionale in the preceding cases, the dissent raised several points.
First, the dissent noted that in Yellow Cab, "the Court explicitly
held that restraints imposed by the corporate parent on the affil-
iates that it already owned in themselves violated § 1."" The
dissent noted further that the holding in Kiefer-Stewart was
clear and unequivocal, and that, in Kiefer-Stewart the Court
considered and rejected the claim that Yellow Cab was confined
to cases in which the acquisitions themselves were illegal. 7 The
dissent argued that stare decisis is particularly important in the
area of statutory construction because if Congress disagrees with
the courts' construction, it is free to change the statute at any
time. Because Congress had accepted the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine for so many years, the dissent clearly believed
that Congress agreed with this interpretation of section one.
Thus, the dissent argued that "[a]t a minimum there should be
a strong presumption against the approach taken today by the
Court.""8
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2748. The seven cases referred to are: Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. United
States, 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944). Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2746-48 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
85. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2746-48.
86. Id. at 2746-47 & n.2 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 2748 n.4.
88. Id. at 2749.
[Vol. 5:879
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The dissent also disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act, saying that it was clear from the lan-
guage of the Act that section one was intended to cover agree-
ments between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. In
passing the Sherman Act, Congress was particularly concerned
with "trusts" that consisted of affiliated corporations, whose ob-
ject was to restrict competition to the detriment of the con-
sumer. Thus, the dissent reasoned that Congress specifically in-
tended that agreements between affiliated corporations that
restrict competition would be subject to section one.89 The dis-
sent rejected the majority's argument that the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine unnecessarily elevated form over substance.
Although in many circumstances the argument can be made,
there are instances in which such conspiracies do restrain trade
and have an anticompetitive result. Thus, according to the dis-
sent, the Court's per se rule is too broad.90 The dissent reasoned
that the doctrine had an economic justification in antitrust law
because it addressed a gap in antitrust enforcement. The in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine reached anticompetitive agree-
ments between affiliated corporations that had sufficient market
power to restrain marketwide competition but not sufficient
power to be considered monopolists within the ambit of section
two." The dissent concluded that the doctrine served a useful
antitrust purpose, and reached conduct that was within the in-
tended scope of the Sherman Act. Thus, the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine should not have been abolished by a per se rule
of legality such as the one adopted by the majority.'2
V. Analysis
The Supreme Court's repudiation of the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine has been heralded as long overdue.' Aca-
89. Id. at 2751 & nn.17-18. In support of this position the dissent cited speeches
made by Senators in support of the Act, in which "trusts" were cited as a primary con-
cern of the Act. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2457, 2569 (1890) (statements of Sen. Sherman).
90. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2752.
92. Id. at 2754-55.
93. McDavid, The Courts Welcome Demise of the "Bathtub" Conspiracy Doctrine,
6 NAT'L L.J. 22 (1984).
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demic commentary on the doctrine has been uniformly critical.94
It is important, however, to recognize the principles upon which
the Court based its decision and to determine the reasons for
the Court's willingness to repudiate the doctrine and overrule a
long line of prior decisions.
The Court based its repudiation of the doctrine on three
distinct grounds. First, in previous cases, the doctrine was un-
necessary to the end result and was merely an alternative ration-
ale.9 5 Second, a section one violation requires an agreement be-
tween two or more entities, and for antitrust purposes, a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary are a single entity."6 Finally,
Congress intended that there be a certain "gap" between section
one and section two proscriptions, and there was no justification
for a rule that attempted to fill that "gap.""
A. Handling of Prior Precedent
The majority's handling of Yellow Cab and it's progeny was
somewhat cursory given the circumstances. As the dissent noted,
"any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands spe-
cial justification" especially in the area of statutory
construction."
The Court distinguished the prior decisions upon which the
94. See, e.g, Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451
(1983) (concluding that the doctrine has little basis in antitrust logic or policy); Handler
& Smart, supra note 19 (The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine advances no discernable
antitrust goals.); Kempf, supra note 36, at 173 (stating that intraenterprise conspiracy is
an ill-conceived legal doctrine); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183 (1955) (Within the present Sherman
Act, there is no place for a doctrine of intraenterprise conspiracy.); Willis & Pitofsky,
supra note 35, at 52 (The collateral disadvantages of a broad intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine more than outweigh the occasional advantage it may furnish the government or
a private plaintiff in a particular case.); Note, supra note 39, at 681 (The existing in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine promotes behavior inconsistent with antitrust goals.);
Note, supra note 36, at 729 (suggesting that the doctrine, as presently applied to the
Courts, fails to further any antitrust policy). See also Barndt, Two Trees or
One? - The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MoNT. L. REV. 158 (1962);
Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J.
5 (1963).
95. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2736-39 (1984).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
96. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
97. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740-43. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
98. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine had been based, stating that
those cases actually stood for a more narrow rule.9 9 After quot-
ing the passage in Yellow Cab that gave rise to the doctrine,100
the Court stated that the passage "more accurately [stood] for a
quite different proposition.'" 10 1 The majority's reading of Yellow
Cab was that the affiliation of the defendants was irrelevant be-
cause the original acquisitions were illegal under section one
since they constituted a combination in restraint of trade, espe-
cially when the original anticompetitive purpose of the combina-
tion was evidenced by the subsequent actions of the affiliated
entities. 02 Although this interpretation of Yellow Cab may be
justified upon a close inspection of the decision and has been
advocated by certain commentators,10 3 the language in Yellow
Cab was equivocal. It was not entirely clear that the basis for the
holding was the illegality of the initial acquisitions. If Yellow
Cab actually stood for this narrower rule,'10 4 the Court had sev-
eral opportunities to make this clear.
In fact, in Kiefer-Stewart, Timken, and Perma Life, the
Court merely cited the broad language of Yellow Cab, conclud-
ing that common ownership did not exempt corporations from
99. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2736-39. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. In Yellow Cab, the Court stated that "the common ownership and control of
the various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and
conspiracy from the impact of the Act." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2737 (quoting United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947)).
101. Id. at 2737. Thus, the Court rejected the broad interpretation of this passage
adopted in decisions subsequent to Yellow Cab. That interpretation subjected concerted
activity of a parent and its subsidiary to section one scrutiny based solely upon their
separate incorporation. See e.g., notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
102. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2737 n.4. The Court stated that "our point is that
the illegality of the initial acquisition was a predicate for [the Yellow Cab Court's] hold-
ing that any post-acquisition conduct violated the Act." Id.
103. See Note, supra note 39, at 719. The author noted that the Court in Yellow
Cab had initially observed that restraint of trade was the primary objective of the combi-
nation. Thus, if this was a combination that effectuated a prior conspiracy among inde-
pendent firms the initial combination would be a violation of section one. The subse-
quent combination could then be attacked as the fruit of that conspiracy, and common
ownership would clearly be no defense to the antitrust attack. Id. See also Handler &
Smart, supra note 19 at 28-29 (concluding that Yellow Cab stood for the proposition that
a series of acquisitions, if they resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade, may consti-
tute a violation of section one); McQuade, supra note 94, at 194-95 (interpreting Yellow
Cab to hold that the process of intergrating may be a conspiracy when the affiliation has
as its object restraint of trade, thus the "entity" is a result of the conspiracy).
104. For the "narrower rule" see supra notes 39, 44, 102 and accompanying text.
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section one liability.10 5 In addition, the Court demonstrated its
acquiescence to the doctrine by declining to grant certiorari in a
number of recent cases that based liability on the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine. 0 6
Was the doctrine, in fact, an alternative rationale in the
cases following Yellow Cab? Because Kiefer-Stewart did not in-
volve a situation in which there was an initial acquisition which
could serve as the basis for section one liability, the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine was the sole basis for a finding of lia-
bility.10 7 The Copperweld majority states that in Timken, be-
cause there was evidence that the initial acquisitions were
designed to effectuate restrictive practices, reliance on the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine was unnecessary to the re-
sult.10 8 In support of this contention, the majority states that
three judges upholding antitrust liability were of the view that
Timken's "interests in the [foreign] companies were obtained as
part of a plan to promote the illegal trade restraints."109 The
statement quoted was not the basis for those Justices' findings
of Sherman Act liability. That statement was made in support of
upholding the divestiture decree entered by the circuit court.110
In initially deciding that section one of the Sherman Act had
been violated, these three Justices made no mention of the ini-
tial acquisitions; they merely cited Kiefer-Stewart for the pro-
position that common ownership did not liberate the corpora-
tions from the impact of the antitrust laws. 1 Thus, the Timken
Court did not, as the majority suggests, uphold antitrust liability
on the fact that the initial acquisitions were violative of section
105. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Segram & Sons, 340 U.S. at 215 (citing cases).
See supra 29-45 and accompanying text.
106. See e.g, Williams Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v.
Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Photovest
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980);
Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
107. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
108. Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2739.
109. Id. at 2739 n.11 (quoting Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
at 600-01).
110. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600 (1951).
111. Id. at 598 (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. at
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one.
Similarly the majority characterized the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine as "at most an alternative holding" in Perma
Life." 2 The language cited by the majority in support of its "al-
ternative rationale" proposition 13 seems, on the contrary, to in-
dicate that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was the pri-
mary basis for a finding of liability, because in Perma Life, the
plaintiff's did not charge a combination between itself and the
defendants or between the defendant and other franchise deal-
ers. Thus, the fact that such a charge could have supported a
finding of section one liability is more likely the alternative
rationale.
Thus, arguably, in Yellow Cab and the subsequent deci-
sions, the Court did not view the intraenterprise conspiracy doc-
trine as unnecessary or merely an alternative rationale. The ma-
jority's characterization of the doctrine as unnecessary in the
prior cases stems from its analysis of the scope of section one.
The majority's conclusion that the doctrine had no justification
in antitrust law or section one of the Sherman Act made it nec-
essary for them to distinguish the earlier decisions to attempt to
minimize the significance of overruling the doctrine.
B. The Scope of Section One
The majority concluded that section one was never intended
to govern the activities of a parent and its wholly owned subsidi-
ary."" The majority reasoned that the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine did nothing to further the purpose of section one be-
cause agreements between a parent and a subsidiary do not
bring together economic resources that had previously served
112. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2739. The majority bases this statement on the fact
that, after citing Yellow Cab and Timken in support of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine, the Perma Life Court added "'[i]n any event' each plaintiff could clearly
charge a combination between itself and the defendants or between the defendants and
other franchise dealers." Id.
113. See supra note 112.
114. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740-44. "In part because it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-run anti-competitive effects, Con-
gress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of
monopolization." Id. at 2740.
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different interests.115 Additionally, the Court found that the doc-
trine lacked utility in antitrust enforcement because it would
merely encourage parent corporations to restructure their sub-
sidiaries into unincorporated divisions. From an economic stand-
point there are many benefits to be had from conducting busi-
ness through wholly owned subsidiaries as opposed to
unincorporated divisions," 6 and no valid antitrust purpose is
served by subjecting a corporation to antitrust liability based
upon the type of organizational structure adopted by that
corporation.1
The dissent, however, claimed the doctrine had economic
justification in that it addressed a gap in antitrust enforcement
by reaching anticompetitive agreements between affiliated cor-
porations that have sufficient market power to restrain
marketwide competition but not sufficient power to be consid-
ered monopolists under section two of the Act."' Turning to leg-
islative history, the dissent concluded that the corporate subsidi-
ary, when used as a device to eliminate competition, was one of
the chief evils to which the Sherman Act was addressed." 9 The
dissent felt it was clear that the conduct that Congress sought to
proscribe went further than mere acquisitions and that section
115. Id. at 2742. As noted earlier, see supra notes 17, 18, 75 and accompanying text,
the reason Congress treated concerted activity more strictly than unilateral activity was
that in concerted activity there is a "joining" of previously separate interests to pursue
common goals, and this "joining" of resources created great anticompetitive risk. Thus,
since the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was applied to cases where there was no
such "joining," the majority reasoned that the doctrine served no valid antitrust purpose.
Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are already
working toward a common objective and, with or without an agreement, the subsidiary
by nature acts for the benefit of the parent. Thus they cannot have "a unity of purpose
or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrange-
ment," upon which a section 1 agreement between conspirators can be found.) Id. (quot-
ing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
116. See Areeda, supra note 94, at 453. Separate incorporation may reduce federal
or state taxes, facilitate compliance with regulatory or reporting laws, allow investors or
lenders to specialize in one aspect of a conglomerate's business, and allow for different
accounting practices when necessary. Id.
117. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742-43.
118. Id. at 2751-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2750-51. Citing the remarks of several Senators in favor of passage of the
Act, including Senator Sherman, the dissent noted that "trusts" consisted of affiliated
corporations, and that the inclusions of "trusts" in the language of section one evidence
Congress' intent that the actions of affiliated corporations, when in restraint of trade,
would be governed by section one. Id. (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2457, 2569 (1890)).
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one prohibitions were intended to apply equally to existing
"trusts."1 20 The majority points out that the passages cited by
the dissent explicitly refer to combinations created for the pur-
pose of restraining trade, and any section one liability placed
upon those trusts for post-acquisition conduct would be predi-
cated on the illegality of the acquisition.' 21 Thus, although both
views draw support from the legislative history, it appears that
the majority's position is more concretely supported by that his-
tory. A review of the debates contained in the Congressional
Record reveals that Congress' chief concern was the combination
of previously independent resources with the purpose to prevent
competition. 12  Thus, section one of the Act was aimed at
preventing such combinations. 2 3 Implicit in a parent-subsidiary
relationship is a common goal: maximization of corporate profits
and growth for the subsidiary and the parent; the economic well-
being of the "organization" as a whole. The actions of a parent
and subsidiary in pursuit of this common goal may, at times,
restrain trade. The Sherman Act's distinction between concerted
activity and unilateral activity is clear. 24 The purpose of the
Act, to promote and encourage free trade and competition while
discouraging activity that restrains trade and competition,' 25 is
clearly furthered by such a distinction.22 Because of the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between anticompetitive activity and
mere "robust competition," the actions of a single entity are
judged more leniently than the concerted activity of more than
one entity. 2 7 The actions of a single entity must reach a level of
monopolization or attempts to monopolize in order to constitute
antitrust violations.12 8 It is logical from an antitrust standpoint,
120. Id. at 2751 n.18.
121. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744 n.23. The majority, quoting Sen. Sherman,
noted that "[ilt is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and
human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combina-
tion." Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
122. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2455-57, 2569 (1890).
123. Id. at 2457 (statement of Sen. Sherman). "This bill... [seeks] to prevent...
combinations, made with a view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or
to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer." Id.
124. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying note 9.
126. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Activities of a single entity which monopolize or attempt
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that the actions of a parent and its subsidiary must be viewed as
actions of a single entity. Although legally distinct by way of
their separate incorporation, a parent and its subsidiary must be
treated as single entity for antitrust purposes in order to further
the goals of the Sherman Act. Because a parent and its subsidi-
ary are necessarily working toward common goals, concerted ac-
tivity between the two does not raise the specter of "inherent
anticompetitive risk" sought to be tempered by section one,
since it does not involve the pooling of resources toward a com-
mon goal of two entities that previously pursued their own inter-
est separately. 2 9 In fact, evaluating the activities of a parent and
its subsidiary under section two furthers the goal of the Act to
promote robust competition within the market place. Only when
robust competition reaches a level that threatens monopoly
should it be prohibited - and then by invocation of section
two of the Sherman Act.
Although the dissent claimed that the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine was useful for addressing a "gap" between sec-
tion one and section two enforcement, the majority was con-
vinced that the doctrine, which penalized actions of a parent
and subsidiary which, if engaged in by a division and its home
office, would be legal, was simply out of step with the reality of
corporate America. A distinction based on organizational struc-
ture simply had no logical justification in today's world of mul-
tifaceted business enterprise.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp." ' should be applauded. Years of attempt-
ing to apply the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine left the
lower courts in disagreement. The Supreme Court, recognizing
this, agreed to re-examine the entire doctrine from basis to ef-
fect in order to clear the waters muddied by Yellow Cab and its
progeny. The benefits of the doctrine were clearly outweighed by
the burdens it created. The Court's recognition that the doctrine
served no plausible antitrust goal is bolstered by the fact that
to monopolize are proscribed. Id. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
130. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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the government agencies entrusted with antitrust enforcement
have been extremely reluctant to rely on the theory.131 The doc-
trine, as it evolved from Yellow Cab, was susceptible of so many
differing interpretations that the Court would have been ill-ad-
vised simply to attempt to formulate a test to limit the doctrine.
Due to the lack of truly meaningful antitrust purposes served by
the doctrine, and its potentially broad reach, the best course
available to the Court was full repudiation, thus obviating any
future problems and returning a sense of reality to antitrust pol-
icy. No longer will section one liability be founded on a firm's
choice of organization.
John T. O'Connor
131. The FTC has not charged an enterprise with illegal conspiracy based solely on
internal discussions or agreements since 1954. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 35, at
31-32; Note, supra note 39, at 729. The Justice Department has "never brought an action
against a parent and its subsidiary corporations . . . charging a conspiracy solely in re-
straint of the trade of the affiliated defendants."). Id. See also Turner, Address before
the American Bar Association, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 685, 687 (1965). "We should not
press to the limits afforded by past decisions wherever on present evaluation those deci-
sions appear to have gone too far. We should not, for example, attempt to push the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as far as a free-wheeling interpretation of the Timken
case might suggest." Id.
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